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NATIONAL SECURITY, POLICING, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON HIIBEL
EVAN N. TURGEON t
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hiibel v. Sixth JudicialDist. Ct., the U.S. Supreme Court
held Nevada's stop-and-identify statute constitutional in a 5-4
decision.' Unlike the decision itself, the scholarly response to
Hiibel has been entirely one-sided and entirely critical of the
majority. 2 Commentators, both on and off the Court's bench, have
argued that permitting a police officer to arrest an individual for
failing to provide his name during a Terry stop dilutes Fourth
Amendment protections vital to preserving Americans' civil
liberties.3 They contend that it resurrects the sort of problems the
Court's void-for-vagueness decisions previously dispensed with,
all for the sake of law enforcement convenience in catching and
prosecuting terrorists. 4 However, these criticisms rely on a faulty
conception of Fourth Amendment rights and reflect outdated
"TUniversity of Virginia School of Law, J.D. candidate, 2009. The author would
like to thank Professor Rachel Harmon for her invaluable guidance throughout
the writing process.
IHiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
2 See, e.g., E. Martin Estrada, CriminalizingSilence: Hiibel and the
Continuing
Expansion of the Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 279 (2005); Arnold H.
Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of Dudley Hiibel, 9/11, and the
Vanishing Fourth Amendment, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 929 (2005); Shelli Calland,
Recent Development, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court: Stop and Identify
Statutes Do Not Violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 251 (2005); James Ryan Kelly, Note, Is Silence Golden? Not After Hiibel
v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 155
(2006); William R. Snyder, Jr., Case Comment, Slipping Down The Slope Of
Probable Cause: An UnreasonableException To What Was Once A Reasonable
Rule, 57 FLA. L. REV. 445 (2005); Jamie L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel
Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the Silent
Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's Decision to Compel Identification,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1478 (2005).
3 See supra note 2.
4 See supra note 2.
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notions about the nature of policing. Far from a blind step down
the totalitarian path, Hiibel represents an appropriate balance of
individual privacy and government interests. It reflects an accurate
conception of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as, the realities of
modern policing.
This article will discuss how the Hiibel decision
demonstrates the true nature of Constitutional protections in
criminal procedure. Part II states Hiibel's facts and the Court's
justification for its holding. Part III discusses the flexible nature of
Fourth Amendment protections, the proper balance of individual
and government interests struck in Hiibel, and precedent
supporting this balance. It also discusses the post-September 11
transformation in the Court's conception of law-enforcement
interests that now prevents the Court from distinguishing situations
involving terrorism from the rest of its criminal procedure
jurisprudence. Part IV discusses the legal reforms, changes in
police practices, and modern racial dynamics that mitigate
concerns of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of laws like
the stop-and-identify statute at issue in Hiibel. Part V proposes
additional future safeguards. Part VI concludes.
II.

THE HIIBEL DECISION

The facts of the Hiibel case are unremarkable. Police in
Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call
reporting an assault, and dispatched Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove to
the scene. 5 When he arrived, he found a red and silver GMC truck
parked by the side of the road, with a man standing beside it and a
young woman sitting in it. 6 Dove approached the man, who
appeared to be intoxicated, and explained that he was investigating
a fight.7 Dove asked the man if he had any identification on him.8
The man refused this request and asked Dove why he wanted
5 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 180.
6id.
7
8

Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
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identification. 9 Dove explained that he was conducting an
investigation and needed to know who the man was and what he
was doing there.' 0 The man refused again, became agitated, and
began to taunt Dove." Officer Dove repeated his request for
identification eleven times and was refused each time. 12 After
warning the man that he would be arrested for failing to comply,
Dove finally arrested him. 13 The man, Dudley Hiibel, was tried in
the Justice Court of Union Township, convicted of violating
Nevada's "stop and identify" statute, 14 and fined $250.15 The Sixth
Judicial District Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of
6 Hiibel's petition for rehearing was
Nevada, in a divided opinion.1
17
denied without opinion.
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Hiibel's
conviction.18 With respect to the Fourth Amendment claims Hiibel
raised on appeal, the Court held that the Nevada statute's provision
granting officers the discretion to arrest a Terry stop suspect for
refusing to identify himself did not violate the Fourth Amendment
9

Id.

10Id.
11Id.
12 Id.
13

Id.

14

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.123 (West 2008) provides, in relevant part, that:

1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer
encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime ...
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to
effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60
minutes. The detention must not extend beyond the place or the
immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first effected,
unless the person is arrested.
15 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182.
16Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002).
17 ild.

18Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177.
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prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. 19 In so holding,
the Court concluded that the statute constitutionally balanced the
intrusion on an individual's privacy against legitimate government
interests.20 The Court found that dangers commonplace to statutes
authorizing officer discretion would not materialize here, since the
Terry stop must be 'justified at its inception, and . . .reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." 21 Additionally, the Court noted that
an officer's discretion to arrest ensures that the authority to make
such a 23"commonsense inquiry" 22 does not become a "legal
nullity."
III.

THE ROLE OF TERRORISM

It seems clear that the events of September 11, 2001
informed the Hiibel Court's reasoning. On its face, Hiibel, a case
decided in the context of a domestic assault investigation, seems
far removed from national security issues. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court does not mention terrorism in its Hiibel opinion,
24
the Nevada Supreme Court opinion brings the issue to the fore.
The federal government picked up on the case's national security
implications, and filed an amicus curiae brief pointing out the
necessity of stop-and-identify authority in identifying individuals
on terrorist watch lists and thereby preventing or deterring
imminent crime. 25 Virtually all scholars who have addressed
the
26
reasoning.
Court's
the
informed
terrorism
subject agree that
'9Id. at
20 Id. at
21Id. at
22
[d. at
23 Id.at

185, 188.
188 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
185 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968)).
189.

188.
24 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1206 (Nev. 2002).
25 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
14-15, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554),
2004 WL 121587.
26 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of Dudley
Hiibel, 9111, and the Vanishing Fourth Amendment, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 929,
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A. Sacrificing Freedom for Security?

Hiibel's critics argue that the Court failed to recognize the
Fourth Amendment's content and purpose and, instead, blindly
diluted vital constitutional safeguards when Americans needed
them the most. Thus, they fear that Hiibel represents the Court's
submission to the "powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our
history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional
guarantees and give the police the upper hand." 27 Such concerns
coincide with the widely held view that the Fourth Amendment
should perform a countermajoritarian function, and that courts
should enforce the Bill of Rights in such a way as to safeguard
28
minority rights against encroachment by majority actors.
943 (2005) ("[T]o the extent that 9/11 did give us Hiibel, it seems trite but fair to
say: 'Chalk up one more win for the terrorists."'); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick
0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1842
(classifying Hiibel as one of the cases in which 'judges are beginning to come to
grips with the emergency measures adopted by the government in the wake of
September 11, 2001"); Shelli Calland, Recent Development, Hiibel v. Sixth
JudicialDistrict Court: Stop and Identify Statutes Do Not Violate the Fourth or
Fifth Amendments, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 251, 262 (2005) ("[N]o doubt
the Court's decisions in Hiibel can be attributed at least in part to recent events
that have awakened our country to new and frightening enemies."); Jamie L.
Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the
Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's
Decision to Compel Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1478 (2005) (stating
"the terrorism threat against America likely played a key role in the Court's
decision"); see also Warren Richey, If Police Ask Who You Are, Do You Have to
Say?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
1644756 (noting "heightened concern about possible terrorist activities within
the U.S.").
27 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
21 Susan Herman, for example, cites Justice Stone's famous Carolene Products
footnote four as support for the proposition that the political process cannot be
trusted to protect "discrete and insular minorities," and, therefore, that courts
should declare unconstitutional legislation prejudicing such groups. Susan N.
Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the SubmajoritarianFourth Amendment
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 70 (2006) (referencing United States v.
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Adherents to this view would agree with Judge Agosti's dissent
from the Nevada Supreme Court decision in which she argued that
"being forced to identify oneself to a police officer or else face
arrest is government coercion - precisely the type of governmental
29
intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent."
Furthermore, critics argue that the citizenry's need for concrete
Fourth Amendment protections is at its zenith in times of crisis,
when the government most demands
power susceptible to abuse at
30
the expense of minority rights.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry")); see also JOHN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 97 (1980) (calling the Fourth Amendment a "harbinger of the Equal
Protection Clause" and emphasizing the "tremendous potential for the arbitrary
or invidious infliction of 'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various
classes other than 'our own"'); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1994)
(noting that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal, they are not subject to
majority rule"); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, III YALE
L.J. 2137, 2143 (2002) (noting that "most constitutional argument assumes that
there is a normatively right answer to the question what the scope of [Fourth and
Fifth Amendment] rights should be, and that the answer is basically fixed").
29 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1209 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J.,
dissenting). In lamenting how the Court had lapsed in its countermajoritarian
duty, Susan Herman cited the U.S. Supreme Court's Hiibel decision as evidence
that "[t]he Court is unlikely to upset decisions made by legislative bodies or
policymakers about what searches and seizures are reasonable." Herman, supra
note 28, at 105.
30 Hiibel at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting) (stating that "[n]ow is precisely the time
when our duty to vigilantly guard the rights enumerated in the Constitution
becomes most important"); Calland, supra note 2, at 263 (warning "[i]n these
dangerous times, the truest emergency involves our Constitution, and we must
never sacrifice any part of that Constitution upon the altar of security");
Christopher Metzler, Providing Material Support to Violate the Constitution:
The USA PATRIOT Act and Its Assault on the 4th Amendment, 29 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 35, 64 (2006) (noting "[t]his is not the time to give law enforcement
officials greater leeway; rather, it is time to reinforce the original purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, limiting government action").
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Consequently, Hiibel's critics allege that the events of
September 11 improperly influenced the Court's balancing of
individual and government interests. They argue that individuals
harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy in their names, 3 ' which
the Court here undervalued against the government desire for law
enforcement convenience. 32 Although they concede that "probable
cause can be bent to protect heightened government interests,"
commentators argue that the standard "cannot be broken for the
sole purpose of enabling greater law enforcement efficacy and
authority." 33 They alleged that such a breach happened in 35
this
case, 34 citing precedent they claim contradicts Hiibel's holding.
Additionally, scholars take issue with the fact that the
police authority sanctioned in Hiibel is not limited to seeking out
and arresting terrorists. Rather, police may use these expanded
powers in all of their law-enforcement duties. 3 6 Some
31

Stulin, supra note 2.

32

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 196 (2004) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) (pointing out that police databases allow a name to provide police
with information "tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution"); Estrada,
supra note 2, at 306; see also Hiibel, 59 P.3d, at 1209 (Agosti, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Nevada majority "does not provide any evidence that an
officer, by knowing a person's identity, is better protected from potential
violence").
33 Snyder, supra note 2, at 449-50; see also Metzler, supra note 30, at 50 (noting
that in times of war, "citizens have the opportunity to see the true nature of their
government as its interests subsume their own").
34 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 196 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
Nevada Legislature intended to provide its police officers with a useful law
enforcement tool").
31 See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 2, at 449 (arguing that the Court previously
declined "to uphold a diminished standard of suspicion simply to ensure greater
police efficacy" (referencing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
171 (1972) and Hayes v. Fla., 470 U.S. 811,814 (1985))).
36 See Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2162; Tribe & Gudridge, supra note 26, at 1826.
A Nevada Supreme Court Hiibel concurrence noted as much, stating, "I write
separately to note that the majority has not somehow overreacted to the dangers
presented by the war against domestic and international terrorism. Our decision
today is truly related to the ability of police to properly and safely deal with
persons reasonably suspected of criminal misconduct, here, domestic violence
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commentators argue that such an unwarranted expansion of power
weakens vital Fourth Amendment protections and justifies public
outrage. 7 Others even suggest that Hiibel will result in a
permanent loss of civil liberties.3 8 Justice Breyer expressed such
fears in his Hiibel dissent, in which he asked, "Can a State, in
addition to requiring a stopped individual to answer 'What's your
name?' also require an answer to 'What's your license number?' or
'Where do you live?' 39 Moreover, because police will not
voluntarily abdicate broadened powers, some objectors even
suggest that these 40decisions foretell the United States' devolution
into a police state.
and driving under the influence of alcohol." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59
P.3d 1201, 1207 (Nev. 2002) (Maupin, J., concurring).
17 See Stulin, supra note 2, at 1484 (claiming that "to apply
this tactic to
ordinary police encounters, where learning a suspect's name has nothing to do
with investigating the crime at hand, unnecessarily infringes on privacy rights,
upends precedent, and ensures that the Fourth Amendment will continue to lose
its identity").
38 See Estrada, supra note 2, at 302, 317 ("By unbridling the Terry doctrine from
its earlier restrictions, the Hiibel Court has thrust open the door to the Terry
doctrine's further expansion into new Fourth Amendment frontiers" and causing
the author to fear that the decision steepened "the slippery slope of eroding
individual rights."); M. Christine Klein, A Bird Called Hiibel: The
Criminalizationof Silence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 357, 393 (2004) (calling it
"only a matter of time before [the Court] has the opportunity to decide . . .
whether its rollback of Fourth Amendment protections will be limited to a
search for mere identity, or whether the state will be empowered to arrest its
citizens for rebuffing a wide variety of intrusive inquiries . . . "); Loewy, supra
note 2, at 940 (claiming that "[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government" (citing
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting))).
As Philip M. McVey pointed out, "Bridges and buildings damaged by [terrorist]
campaigns can be quickly repaired, but the restoration of a society's human
rights is often an arduous and multigenerational task." PHILIP M. MCVEY,
TERRORISM AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
CHALLENGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 109 (1997).
39 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 198 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1210 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti,
J., dissenting) ("History bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of
liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end."
40
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B. Contemporary Terrorism and the Fourth
Amendment
However, Hiibel's critics fail to recognize the dynamic
nature of Fourth Amendment protections and the preventative need
to fight terrorism, which ultimately explain the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding.
1. Fluctuating Fourth Amendment
Protections
Far from a strict countermajoritarian bulwark, Fourth
Amendment rights are constantly evolving. 4 1 As Justice Cardozo
stated, "Bills of rights give assurance to the individual of the
preservation of his liberty. They do not define the liberty they
promise." 42 Rather than some stricture in its text, the Fourth

(quoting Barrios-Lomeli v. State, 961 P.2d 750, 752 (Nev. 1998) (quoting Davis
v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)))); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("To give the
police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian
path."); Metzler, supra note 30, at 49 ("The conclusion in Hiibel allowing a state
to require a suspect to disclose his name during the course of a Terry stop has
instigated a barrage of articles which claim that a slippery slope to the total
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights has begun."); see also Philip B. Heymann,
Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV J.
L. PUB. POL'Y 441, 441-42 (2002) ("The issues of discretion involve matters of

life or death, torture, detention without trial, trial without juries, and basic
freedoms to dissent."); Tribe & Gudridge, supra note 26, at 1829.
41See generally Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 197 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

42 Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 97 (1928); see

also Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908):
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and
which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached.
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Amendment's "mandate and touchstone" is reasonableness. 43 The
standard that a police officer must meet in order to justify his
conduct is equally amorphous, since probable cause "is not a thing;
it is a probability measure, a burden of persuasion in other
words." 44 In judging whether certain conduct complies with the
Fourth Amendment, a court asks whether it is reasonable under the
"totality of the circumstances." 45 This totality includes both the
46
particular facts of a case as well as the broader social context.
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment's vague text "positively invites
constructions that change with changing circumstances." 47 As a
result, Fourth Amendment protections can and should change in
relation to both case-specific facts and broader social trends. 48 In
43 Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.

JOHN'S L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1998); see Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187-88 ("The
reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is determined by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate government interests." (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979))).
44 Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1149, 1160 (1998); see also Metzler, supra note 30, at 37 ("As recently as 2003,
the Court described probable cause as "a fluid concept... 'not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."' (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540
U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983))).
45 Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
46 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackmun,
J.,
concurring):
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court's exclusionary rule
decisions, from Weeks [v. United States] through Mapp v. Ohio ...to
the decisions handed down today, it is that the scope of the
exclusionary rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial
understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom.
41 Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 824 (1994).
48 Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2144 ("The scope of these rights is, has been,
and
will be responsive to changes in context."); see also Estrada, supra note 2, at
305 (noting that "the Court has recognized that notions of what constitute
acceptable privacy interests can evolve over time, mirroring changes in societal
norms" (referencing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001))); Dan M. Kahan
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order to avoid charges of judicial activism, however, the
Court
49
couches its contextual reasoning in a contextual principle.
2. The Totality of Today's Circumstances
Against this amorphous standard of reasonableness under a
totality of the circumstances, the Court in Hiibel properly upheld
Nevada's balancing of relevant individual and government
interests. In his article, Local Policing After the Terror, William
Stuntz states:
[E]ither because we usually think of rights as constants, or
because we think that some kinds of rights should never
vary in response to public outcry, the tendency is to think
that rights like those contained in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments should not change in response to events like
those of September 11, 2001. That tendency is wrong. It is
also futile .... 50

& Tracey L. Meares,
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184
doctrinal innovations
the next"); Orin S.

Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
(1998) (noting that as "conditions change, the enlightened
of one generation can become barriers to social progress in
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:

Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004)
(discussing technology's effect on privacy rights under the Constitution).
49 Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2143 n.10 ("Social context matters, but stays under
the table; opinions must be couched in terms of a contextual principle."). See
generally Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 44. See also Kahan & Meares, supra
note 48, at 1157-58:

[T]he Court's leading race-equality cases, including Brown v. Board of
Education and Baker v. Carr, provoked intense political controversy.
Confronted with a sustained attack on its own legitimacy, the Court
changed its tactics. Rather than meet racism head on, the Court began
to fight it indirectly through general constitutional standards that did
not explicitly address race but that there were nonetheless calculated to
constrain racially motivated policies.

50 Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2144.
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Instead, "Constitutional doctrines have life cycles. They are born
of practical need, flourish in an atmosphere of general utility, and
decline as changing conditions drain them of their vitality.'' l As
the Nevada Supreme Court noted, the attacks of September 11
changed American conditions by increasing the government's
interest in allowing police to identify individuals. 52 Conversely, it
seems that individuals today have little interest in keeping their
names private. The great value to police of information individuals
routinely disclose strongly suggests that the Nevada statute does
not represent such an unjustifiable infringement on individual
privacy as to be labeled unconstitutional.
a. Intrusion on Individual Privacy
In America today, providing one's name to a police officer
can hardly be deemed an intrusion on individual privacy. The act
itself is simple, requiring an individual to communicate only a
handful of words. Additionally, experience suggests that most
individuals do not harbor a subjective expectation of privacy in
their identities, but rather willingly and unknowingly provide their
names to complete strangers routinely. Many people publicize their
identities by permitting their names to be listed in the phonebook
and many label their mailboxes with their names, all for others'
convenience. Furthermore, people purchase items with checks and
credit cards requiring identification or listing their names. Identity
disclosure is especially prevalent on the internet, as internet access
requires broadcasting one's IP address, from which one's name,
location, and other information can be determined.53
51

Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1153.

52

See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002) (stating

that the war on terror is "a different kind of war that requires a different type of
approach and a different type of mentality" (quoting President George W. Bush,
Address During a News Conference (Oct. 11, 2001))).
53 This says nothing of recently popular social networking sites such as
Facebook and MySpace, which require the publication of one's name and often
disclose much more to complete strangers.
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Moreover, considering that the Court regularly declines to
recognize an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in areas
indisputably more sensitive and personal than one's identity, any
subjective expectation of privacy in one's name cannot be justified
as objectively reasonable. 54 The Court has upheld the principle that
individuals, who knowingly communicate with others, even in
private conversation, have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information communicated.55 In California v. Greenwood, the
Court held that individuals void any reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of opaque, plastic garbage bags when they
place such bags on the street for collection. 56 And in Florida v.
Riley, the Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in
57
greenhouses that can be seen into from hovering helicopters.
Hiibel's 58
holding seems completely consistent with such
precedent.
b. The Government Interest in
Identification
In light of the legitimate government interests that Hiibel's
stop-and-identify statute serves, the Court properly found the law
constitutional. Preventing police officers from arresting individuals
who refuse to identify themselves would inhibit law enforcement's
ability to fight terrorism and it would actually necessitate more
local police intrusion on individual privacy during Terry stops. As
Justice Stevens noted in his Hiibel dissent, police databases allow
officers to access a variety of criminal information from the
street, 59 which allows officers to particularize their interactions
E.g., U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 (1988); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
55 See White, 401 U.S. at 751-52.
56 486 U.S. at 40-41.
57 488 U.S. at 450-5 1.
58 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
59 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 196 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at 33
54

(2006) ("in more than a third of local police departments, at least some officers
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with individuals based on what they learn. Such particularization
benefits both society and police in several ways. First, it notifies
the officer if the individual is wanted for questioning or if there is a
warrant out for his arrest, which would provide probable cause for
an arrest. Second, it alerts the officer if the individual is a
suspected terrorist or suffers from a mental disorder, thus advising
the officer of specific dangers and enabling him to take protective
measures. 60 Third, it provides the officer a context in which to
evaluate the suspect's story, based on his reputation in the
community, which in some situations dispels the officer's concerns
and reduces 6 1 his incentive to conduct a more intrusive
investigation.
3. Precedent Distinguishes Potential
Terrorism
An examination of earlier Court decisions reveals that the
Court has always indicated a willingness to defer to the executive
in cases implicating national security.
The Court's Katz v. United States decision marked the
constitutionalization of criminal procedure. 62 In that case, the
majority held that the Fourth Amendment protects persons, not
places, from unreasonable searches and seizures. 63 Additionally,
in the field could use computers to access vehicle records, driving records, and
warrants during 2003. This included a majority of the departments serving a
population of 10,000 or more residents.").
60 Despite some critics' comments policing remains a very dangerous job. From
1997 to 2006, 562 police officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty, and
in 2006 alone, 58,634 officers were assaulted while performing their duties, with
26.8% of these officers suffering injuries as a result. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED

AND ASSAULTED, 2006 (2007); see, e.g., Klein, supra note 38, at 379 (calling the

officer safety rationale "not convincing").
61 This particularization may "reduce[] the potential for capricious exercises of
police discretion to a significant degree." Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the
Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 141, 188.
62389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63

Id. at 353.
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Justice Harlan enunciated a two-part test for determining whether
or not a search is reasonable, and, therefore, whether or not Fourth
Amendment protections are triggered.64 But, even here, the
majority left open the question of "[w]hether safeguards other than
prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national security ....
,,65 In
his concurrence, Justice White answered this question in the
affirmative, arguing
for deference to the executive under such
66
circumstances.
In its 1972 decision, United States v. United States District
67
Court, the Court addressed this issue directly, balancing
individual privacy interests against the government's interest in
preventing terrorism. 68 In that case, the government's request for a
complete exemption from Fourth Amendment requirements in
conducting surveillance to catch terrorists was denied. 69 However,
the Court did note that Fourth Amendment requirements "may
vary according to the governmental interest to70 be enforced and the
nature of citizen rights deserving protection.'
64

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
358 n.23.
Id. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring).
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
One of the defendants in the original case was charged with conspiracy to

65 [d. at
66

67
68

damage Government property and with the dynamite bombing of a Central
Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Id. at 299.
69
Id.at 321.
70 Id. at 323 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court of City and
County of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)). The Court also noted that "the
emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful
activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible
future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less
precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." 407 U.S. at
322. This seems to suggest that "[t]he prevention of substantial ... harm to the
nation justifies dispensing with the Fourth Amendment's mandate that ' ... no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, . . .particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' RONALD JAY
ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(citations omitted).

1027 n.2 (2nd ed. 2005)
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In 2000, the Court in Florida v. J.L. 71 held that an
unverified anonymous tip reporting an individual carrying a
handgun bore insufficient indicia of reliability to justify a search.7 2
However, writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsberg
suggested that the government's compelling interest in preventing
terrorism would justify permitting such a search, stating, "We do
not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb
need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a
person carrying 73a firearm before the police can constitutionally
conduct a frisk.,
Similarly, in its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
formally adopted the public safety exception to Miranda warning
requirements in New York v. Quarles.74 The Court held that the
substantial threat an unholstered handgun concealed in a
supermarket posed to public safety justified a police officer's
failure to provide a Miranda warning, 75 regardless of whether the
officer's subjective motivation was public safety or obtaining
evidence for trial. 76
Since September 11, the Court has further indicated that the
Fourth Amendment's requirements relax when the concern is
terrorism. In 2005, the Court in Illinois v. Caballes77 sanctioned
drug-dog sniffs of automobiles stopped for reasons unrelated to
drug interdiction. 78 Even the dissenters in that case, Justices Souter
and Ginsberg, suggested that they would have voted differently 79
if
dog sniffs were more likely to turn up evidence of terrorism.
Justice Souter stated:

71529 U.S. 266 (2000).
72
[d. at 274.
73
[d. at 273-74.
74 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984).
75
76

[d. at

657-58.

[d. at

656.
77 543 U.S. 405.
78
1Id. at 409.
79

See id. at 410-25.
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I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a
possible case significantly unlike this one. All of us are
concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect
explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons
that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no
individualized suspicion .... Unreasonable sniff searches

for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff
searches for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs
are a societal risk.80
Justice Ginsberg also distinguished the considerable danger
presented by terrorism, stating that "[a] dog sniff for explosives,
involving security interests not presented here, would be an
entirely different matter."8 1 Furthermore, the Court in In re Sealed
Case82 noted that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review cited several U.S. Supreme Court decisions authorizing
warrantless searches when facing a pressing government need, and
that "itis hard to imagine greater emergencies facing Americans"
than "terrorists
and espionage threats directed by foreign
83
powers."
These cases indicate that the Court has long responded to
changing national threats. Both before and since September 11, the
Court noted the propriety of granting discretion to the government
in cases directly addressing terrorism or those otherwise likely to
implicate national security concerns.8 4 The Court thus responds to
80

Id. at 417 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

81 Id. at 423 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). Ginsberg also mentioned that an

"immediate, present danger of explosives would likely justify a bomb sniff
under the special needs doctrine." Id. at 425 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
82 Inre Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (For. Intel. Surv. Rev. 2002).
83
84

Id. at 746.
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Civil Liberties in the

Dragons' Domain: Negotiating the Blurred Boundary Between Domestic Law
and Foreign Affairs After 9/11, in SEPTEMBER 11 N HISTORY: A WATERSHED
MOMENT? 163, 163-64, 166-67 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003) ("Doubtful of their
competence and fearful that their errors might jeopardize national interests,
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terrorist crime waves the same way it responds to other crime
waves: by granting police officers additional authority to prevent
crime. 85 Even in Terry v. Ohio, the Court approved Officer
McFadden's preventative policing tactics in the context of a
national crime wave. 86 Therefore, in context, it seems natural that
"[s]ince September 11, the Supreme Court has decided thirteen of
the fourteen Fourth Amendment cases it has heard[,]" including
Hiibel, "in favor of the government .... 87
4. Potential Terrorism Realized
The preventative nature of fighting terrorism could explain
why the Court did not seek to limit its decision to terrorism
investigations. 88 As noted previously, before September 11, the
Court was able to draw a distinction between cases concerning
terrorism and those not concerning terrorism, which it did in cases
such as Katz and Caballes.89 However, the Hiibel Court recognizes
that things are different today. 90 Terrorism is now a concern, and
antiterrorism work is preventative in nature. 91 A police officer will
likely only suspect an individual of plotting terrorism upon
learning his identity and, thus, the Court can no longer permit
certain procedures when investigating terrorism and forbid those
procedures in less serious cases. 92 The circumstances of any given
judges have traditionally granted Congress and the president almost complete
discretion over questions about immigration, the military, espionage, and many
other aspects of foreign affairs. To American judges, foreign policy is an
unordered wilderness, the domain of realpolitik rather than reason.").
85 See Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2138 ("Crime waves always carry with them
calls for more law enforcement authority.").
86 392 U.S. 1,23-24 n.21 (1968).
87

Herman, supra note 28, at 131.

" See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 25, at 4.

The events at issue in Caballes took place in 1998, before terrorism was a
salient concern for American law enforcement officers.
89

90 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 186-88 (2004).

9' See Stulin, supra note 2, at 1476-78.
92 See Calland, supra note 2, at 253 n.22.
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Terry stop may suggest terrorism, so if any officer conducting a
Terry stop is to have authority commensurate with such an
investigation, all officers must. Since it would not have been
possible to limit Hiibel's stop-and-identify authority to terrorism
investigations, the Court did not need to mention terrorism in its
opinion.
Additionally, since the same Constitutional criminal
procedure applies to federal law enforcement agencies and local
police departments, 93 restricting local police authority would have
the effect of tying federal agencies' hands as well. Such
restrictions would raise the cost of federal law enforcement efforts,
including personnel demands. 94 It is possible 9 that such
considerations further informed the Court's reasoning. 5
IV.

POLICE INCENTIVES

A. Vagueness Concerns Resurrected?
Commentators have suggested that Hiibel sanctions a
preventative law enforcement agenda, 96 which will revive the very
practices the Court previously sought to eliminate in its "void for
93 See Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2162 ("[T]he pressure on the law comes from

terrorism, but the relevant power extends to local police investigating local
crimes.").
94 See Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2145 ("Restrictions on police authority act as
a

tax; they make criminal investigation more expensive than it otherwise might
be."). Decreased police efficiency necessitates increasing the number of police
employed to maintain a constant level of crime deterrence. Id.
9'See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186.
96 Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-SupportLaws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26-27 (2005) ("[W]hereas in
the past the priority with respect to terrorism was to prosecute suspected
terrorists in a traditional manner . . . the overriding priority of the Department
since 9/11 is to prevent attacks before they occur using all available tools.")
(citations omitted); see also Calland, supra note 2, at 26; Eric S. Janus, The
Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators:Countering the Threat of a
New OutsiderJurisprudence,40 CRIM. L. BULL 576 (2004) (noting that "radical
prevention operates by substantially curtailing people's liberty").
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97

vagueness" decisions.
Traditional vagueness doctrine recognizes that an imprecise
law, or one that criminalizes common conduct, grants law
enforcement excessive discretion in determining whom to arrest
and prosecute. 98 The underlying fear is that unscrupulous police
officers will use this discretion to harass and persecute members of
minority groups. To avoid this, courts should invalidate laws that
vest the police with broad 00discretion. 99 The Court has done this
frequently since the 1960s.1

Several scholars see such vagueness concerns arising from
the Nevada stop-and-identify statute at issue in Hiibel.1°1 Critics
argue that the authority to arrest sanctioned in Hiibel is susceptible
to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 10 2 by officers
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime,"' 10 3 and that such officers will use their authority to conduct

97 See, e.g., Lawson v. Kolender, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachristou v. City of

Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
98
See David H. Gans, Strategic FacialChallenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1365
(2005); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
PenalStatutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 215 (1985).
99 See Jeffries, supra note 98, at 214 ("[I]nhibiting racial discrimination in law
enforcement is very much a part of what the rule of law is all about.").
100 Herman, supra note 28, at 119; see, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41 (1999); Kolender, 461 U.S. 352; Papachristou,405 U.S. 156; Davis,
394 U.S. 721.
101This assertion is easy to make, since even the Hiibel majority pointed out that
"[s]top and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws
with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of
investigatory stops." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 183 (2004).
102 See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 2, at 452-53 (claiming that the Hiibel
decision
"may have heralded a return to the days of unchecked police discretion
exemplified by the Jacksonville ordinance at issue in Papachristou").
103 Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also United States v.
United States Dist. Ct. 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (noting the need of the Fourth
Amendment "to check 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement" (quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971))).
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broad-ranging searches 10 4 in violation of minorities' civil rights. 0l'
Judge Agosti suggested as much in her Nevada Supreme Court
dissent, in which she argued that that court failed to keep up its
"struggles against arbitrary power,"' 10 6 stating that "[t]he majority,
by its decision today, has allowed the first layer of our civil
liberties to be whittled away. The holding weakens the democratic
principles upon which this great nation was founded."' 1 7 These
arguments Justice Douglas made in his Terry dissent. Justice
Douglas advised against permitting stops based on reasonable
suspicion alone for fear that, a lack of the probable cause
requirement would "leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the
08
caprice."'
or
whim
officers'

104 See

Livingston, supra note 61, at 186-87 ("An officer may elect to make a
'public order' arrest, for instance, without attempting to negotiate an end to
troublesome conduct. This is because his real motivation is not order
maintenance at all. Instead, the officer wants to arrest so that he can conduct a
search incident to arrest in the hope that this search will reveal evidence of more
serious crime.").
105 See, e.g., Stulin, supra note 2, at 1485 ("[H]istory has suggested that when
the Court diminishes privacy rights, it is often poor and minority populations
who suffer the most."); see also Herman, supra note 28, at 119 ("Even if a
majority of Americans were willing to sacrifice the privacy of Arab and Muslim
men, the presumed targets of much of the government's attention, that does not
make a discriminatory search policy reasonable."); Tribe & Gudridge, supra
note 26, at 1841 (arguing that the government's response to September II
invites "discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, or religion," and that
"minorities, old and new, are in the soup" (quoting Christopher Edley, Jr., The
New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/ll, in THE WAR ON OUR
FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 170, 192 (Richard C.
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., Public Affairs (2003))).
106 Metzler, supra note 30, at 37 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
107 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 59 P.3d 1201, 1210 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J.,
dissenting). Hiibel's Supreme Court petitioner also made this argument,
claiming that the statute "creates a risk of arbitrary police conduct that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S.
177, 188 (2004).
108 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,36 n.3 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Thus, commentators frame Hiibel as an unjustified
departure from precedent. Several critics equate the Hiibel stopand-identify statute with the stop-and-identify statute deemed
unconstitutionally vague in Lawson v. Kolender.10 9 Critics cite to
Justice Brennan's Kolender concurrence, 110 in which he rejected
the argument that entrusting an officer with broad arrest power
would serve important law enforcement interests, stating that "the
balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public
interest in effective law enforcement and the equally public interest
in safeguarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary
governmental interference forbids such expansion.""' Some
scholars claim Hiibel unduly departs from other holdings as
well. 1 12 In his Terry concurrence, Justice White stated that the
police might question a person detained in Terry stop, but that he is
"not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal
to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest." 113 The Court repeated
this dictum in Berkemer v. McCarty in 1984.114 Additionally, in
Hayes v. Florida,1 5 the Court held that an officer might not arrest
a suspect for failing to identify himself if the identification request
116
is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.
In his Hiibel dissent, Justice Breyer cited this precedent and

109 See generally Kolender, 461 U.S. 352.
110See, e.g., Estrada, supra note 2, at 291; Klein, supra note 38, at 374; Loewy,

supra note 2, at 938; Calland, supra note 2, at 256; Stulin, supra note 2, at 1465.
I Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring).
112 See, e.g., Estrada, supra note 2, at 302; Stulin, supra
note 2, at 1466; Calland,
supra note 2, at 262.
113 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). Note that just

six months earlier in Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1967), Justice
White distinguished terrorism, arguing for deference to the executive in cases of
national security.
114 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
115 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985).
116

The Court found such circumstances in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979),

and held that police lacked "any reasonable suspicion" to detain the particular
petitioner and require him to identify himself. Id. at 53.
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claimed that the majority
had not "presented any ...convincing
'1 17
justification for change."
B. Modern Incentives on Police
However, changes to the law, revised police protocols, and
changes in societal racial dynamics since the 1960s, provide
incentives to police officers not to enforce stop-and-identify
statutes arbitrarily and discriminatorily. While these incentives
cannot completely prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of criminal laws, they should be considered in
evaluating a law's potential for prejudiced application.
The Supreme Court has long considered such factors. In
United States v. Leon, the Court noted the importance of weighing
the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule rather than applying
it indiscriminately. 118 The Court clarified this position in
PennsylvaniaBoard of Probationand Parole v. Scott, stating that
the rule "applies only where its deterrence benefits outweigh the
substantial social costs." 119 In Hudson v.Michigan,120 the Court
balanced such interests and declined to apply the exclusionary rule
in that case. 12 1 As Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]e cannot assume that
117542 U.S. 177, 199 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
11'

468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984); see also id. at 926 (denying applying the

exclusionary rule in this case, because "the rule's purposes will only rarely be
served by applying it in such circumstances").
119 524 U.S. 357, 357 (1998).
120547

U.S. 586 (2006).

121 The

Court cited civil suits, "the increasing professionalism of police forces,

including new emphasis on internal police discipline .. .wide-ranging reforms
in the education, training, and supervision of police officers" as sufficiently

powerful incentives on modern police to justify keeping evidence resulting from
a police violation of the knock and announce rule as sufficiently powerful
incentives on modern police to justify not excluding evidence resulting from a
police violation of the knock-and-announce rule in this case. Id.at 596-99
(citing SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 51 (1993)); Empirical data on police
recruitment supports these assertions of police professionalism. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS,
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exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply because
we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and
long ago. That would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins
and inadequacies
of a legal regime that existed almost half a
122
century ago."'

These decisions illustrate the modern Court's trend of
deferring more authority to law enforcement when officers have
other incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement. Modern legal remedies, policing
practices, and minority enfranchisement impose such incentives on
police, encouraging them to act reasonably even when granted
more authority, as they were in Hiibel.123 Such considerations
likely influenced the Court's decision to hold the Hiibel statute
constitutional.
1. Legal Remedies
Numerous modern legal mechanisms provide redress for
abusive police conduct, regardless of whether the victim is arrested
or prosecuted. Indeed, today's law "forbids discriminatory
practices that it once required."' 124 Civil suits for excessive use of
force under federal 125 and state law are available to remedy police

2003 at 21 (2006) (explaining that "[i]n an effort to hire officers more suited to

community policing, 27% percent of local police departments, employing 32%
of all officers, assessed new recruits' analytical and problem-solving abilities as
part of the selection process. Fourteen percent of departments, employing 23%
of officers, assessed recruits' understanding of culturally diverse populations.
Ten percent of departments, employing 12% of officers, assessed mediation
skills and ability to manage interpersonal conflicts;"); see also id. at 9 (noting
that the number of departments with some sort of college education requirement
more than tripled between 1990 and 2000).
Hudson 547 U.S. at 597.
generally Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
124 William J. Stuntz, The PoliticalConstitution of CriminalJustice, 119 HARV.
122

123See

L. REV. 780, 815 (2006).
12542 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (West 2008).
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abuses. 126 As scholar Carl Klockars discusses, civil suits deter
police who fear "the charge of brutality and the scandal such a
charge may inspire."' 127 Additionally, the Police Pattern or Practice
provision (known as § 14141) in the Crime Control Act of 1994
makes it illegal for "any governmental authority ...to engage in a

pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers... that
deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 12 1 Such
suits, which can be brought against police officer and department
alike, pressure individual officers to act reasonably and encourage
police departments to monitor their officers.
2.

New Policing Strategies

Police
practices
have
undergone
two
radical
transformations since the 1960s. After constitutionalizing criminal
procedure in Katz, 129 the Court invalidated vague laws and limited
police discretion in an effort to prevent racial discrimination by the
police. 130 As a result, police in urban areas in the 1970s and 1980s
retreated from the street. 131 The consequent lack of deterrence led
to a dramatic increase in drug use and crime in many cities, 132 as
126

Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control, in POLICE

VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 1,

4

(William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
127 Id. at

7.

12'42 U.S.C.A. § 14141(a) (West 2008).
129Katz, 389 U.S. 347; see Kerr, supra note 48, at 860 ("[I]t is difficult to

contest the fact that over the last forty years the Court has constitutionalized the
law governing criminal investigations. Today, the law of criminal procedure is
mostly constitutional law.").
130 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1153 ("[T]he Court, beginning
in the
1960's and continuing well into the 1970's, erected a dense network of rules to

delimit the permissible bounds of discretionary law-enforcement authority.").
131 David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father'sPolice Department: Making Sense
of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1209, 1213 (2006) ("[B]y the end of the 1960s . . . police felt themselves
increasingly under siege.").

132See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 124, at 781-82 ("The
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well as to "white flight" from urban centers. 133 Political pressure to
address urban crime and police legitimacy scandals of the 1990s
drove police departments to change continually their methods in
recognition of the fact that infrequent, often-confrontational policecitizen interactions foster a police-community relationship
antithetical to preventing crime. 134 New strategies, collectively
referred to as "community policing," assign officers to particular
135
136 in
areas
instruct them
to conduct
foot and
bicycle patrols
an effortand
to produce
frequent
police-citizen
interactions
and foster

constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after helped to create the harsh
justice of the 1970s and after. Overcriminalization, excessive punishment,
racially skewed drug enforcement, overfunding of prisons and underfunding of
everything else these familiar political problems are as much the consequences
of constitutional regulation as the reasons for it.").
133 See generally DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AND THE LAW 117-53 (1995); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS (1993); GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS:
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION (1991). The
1981 film ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK (AVCO Embassy Pictures), presents a
perfect snapshot of the public's fear of rising urban crime at the time. A
summary of the film's plot notes, "In 1988, the U.S. turned Manhattan, New
York into a maximum security prison where the most brutal criminals are
residing for life, due to the 400% rise in crime rates." The Internet Movie
Database,
Escape From New York (1981)
Plot summary,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0082340/plotsummary (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
134 See David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOCY
REV. 635, 668 (2005).
135 In the 12-month period ending June 30, 2000, 90% of police agencies serving
cities with populations over 250,000 "[g]ave patrol officers responsibility for
specific geographic areas." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000, 6 (2002).
136 In cities with populations over 250,000, police bicycle use jumped
dramatically in the 1990s. Ninety-eight percent of departments serving such
communities used them in 2000, compared to 39% in 1990. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1N LARGE CITIES,
1990-2000 at 8 (2002). By 2003, use had dropped slightly, to around 75%.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE
DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at 13 (2006).
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a cooperative, reciprocal police-community relationship 137 that

enables officers to remain informed about goings-on in the
community. 138 Several scholars have noted that "when properly
implemented, [community policing has] been credited with
controlling crime[,]"'1403 9 and with improving the overall "quality of
life" in urban areas.

These new strategies provide incentives to police officers to
employ their legal authority in a manner reasonable to the
community. Modem community policing depends on a cooperative
relationship between law enforcement and the community 42
it
serves.141 Regular police-community meetings are a part of this.1

137Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement

and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219,
1225 (2000) (citing Hubert Williams & Antony M. Pate, Returning to First
Principles: Reducing the Fear of Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 53

(1987)) (indicating that "increased quality of contact between citizens and police
such as door-to-door police visits in the neighborhood and other nonconfrontational interactions with the community members gave the police more
opportunities to feel connected to the communities, learn about their desires, and
better serve them").
13'Brooks, supra note 137, at 1224; see also Livingston, supra note 61, at 188
("[T]o the extent that a police department structures its work to ensure that
officers develop significant community-specific knowledge about the problems
they are addressing, the exercise of police discretion is likely to be both better
informed and more judicious.").
139 Brooks, supra note 137, at 1264 (citing Wesley G.
Skogan, DISORDER AND
DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS

109-24 (1990); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,97 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 578-91 (1997)).
140 Livingston, supra note 61,
at 141. Ironically, "[o]n the surface, these
community policing techniques bear a striking resemblance to the ones that
communities used to reinforce the exclusion of minorities from the Nation's
political life before the 1960's." Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1154.
141Sixty percent of departments, including more than 80% of those
serving
25,000 or more residents, had problem-solving partnerships, or written
agreements with community groups, local agencies, or others during the 12month period ending June 30, 2003. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at iii (2006).
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At such meetings, community members provide feedback to police
departments, which directly pressure individual officers and entire
departments to conduct activities the community approves of in a
manner reasonable to the community. 143 Additionally, political
pressure from city leaders, who must answer to the enfranchised
public for police conduct at election time, compels the police to
self-regulate adequately. 144 Many departments do so through
internal affairs divisions, which investigate claims of police
misconduct, issue administrative sanctions up to and including
145
termination, and even turn some cases over to prosecutors.
142

In the 12-month period ending June 30, 2000, all police agencies serving

cities with populations over 250,000 "[m]et at least quarterly with citizen groups
to discuss crime-related problems." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000 at 6 (2002).
143 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE
DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at 21 (2006) (explaining that in 2003, "Fourteen percent of
departments, employing 34% of all officers, included participation in
collaborative problem-solving projects in the performance evaluation criteria for
patrol officers. An estimated 37% of departments .

.

. collaborated with citizen

groups to elicit feedback for developing community-policing strategies. This
included more than two-thirds of departments serving a population of 25,000 or
more"); see also Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1174-75 (noting that if a
community "is affected in a vital way by the discretionary policing strategy in
question, then the approval of that policy by the community's representatives is
compelling evidence that that strategy doesn't present the sorts of dangers that
the void for vagueness doctrine is meant to avert"); Livingston, supra note 61, at
189, 197 (mentioning that "community policing goals of the statute at issue in
Morales were to derive at least in part from some measure of community
consultation and that such public discussion of a public order problem and the
police department's proposed response may help ameliorate the problem before
enforcement ever takes place").
144 Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1159 ("The primary check against
such
abuse . . . is the accountability of law enforcers to the community's political

representatives.") (citation omitted); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 529 (2001) ("[C]rime is one
of those matters about which most voters care a great deal."). Also, note that
such political pressure come only from the public, since local police departments
do not engage in "rent-seeking." Kerr, supra note 48, at 885.
145 See, e.g., Philadelphia Police Department, Reporting Police Misconduct,
http://www.ppdonline.org/hq misconduct.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
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Local accountability thus discourages the sort of active
offender-search
tactics many communities would find
1
46
objectionable.
Such an approach would endanger police honor,
legitimacy, and trust, which "cannot be bought'"14 7 and which
recover slowly from a breach. 14 8 In his post-September 11 case
study of Dearborn, Michigan, David Thacher concluded that these
powerful accountability incentives "drove police to emphasize
... the community protection functions of homeland security and
avoid .. the offender search functions ..... 149 Success in some
large cities indicates that some order-maintenance police strategies
work so police departments are loathe to kill the goose that laid the
golden egg and return to the adversarial
policing model that proved
50
disastrous in the 1970s and 1980s.1

146 In contrast to the recommendations of James Q. Wilson and George L.
Kelling's famous article, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32, which endorses
community policing strategies strictly enforcing low-level laws in order to deter
more serious crime, many modern community policing advocates argue that
such tactics portray the police as an authoritarian adversary rather than the
community's ally against crime; thus poisoning the community-police
relationship and thwarting community policing's ultimate goals; see, e.g.,
Livingston, supra note 61, at 142 ("[P]olice initiatives directed at crime and
disorder have generated concern, anxiety, and outright anger about police
intrusiveness, particularly as directed at minority populations.").
147 Thacher, supra note 134, at 672.
148 Brooks, supra note 137, at 1227 ("Community tension with and distrust of
police may rise with more aggressive policing of low-level offenses.");
Livingston, supra note 61, at 178 (warning that "even when properly employed,
aggressive use of stop and frisk can alienate and estrange communities in ways
that ultimately detract from, rather than contribute to, the maintenance of a
vibrant civil order").
149 Brooks, supra note 137, at 636; Thacher, supra note 134, at 636-37. (Thacher
chose Dearborn as the subject of his study "[b]ecause it has one of the nation's
largest concentrations of Arab Americans and has been a maj or focus of national
attention since 9/11 . .

").

150 Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Meares and Kahan Respond, BOSTON
REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 22, 22 n. 1.
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Even in their antiterrorism duties, police are unlikely to use
15 1
the arrest power sanctioned in Hiibel to enforce criminal laws.
Due to a lack of manpower at the federal level,15 2 it is true that
state police agencies, including local police departments, will serve
as the "first line of defense against terrorism."1 5 3 However, note
their specific duties. "They monitor subways, sporting events and
even schools,"'154 and "guard public places."' l5 5 Additionally, many
local police departments face manpower constraints in the wake of
their increased duties since September 11.15 6 These constraints
further discourage local officers from actively searching for
terrorists.1 5 7 Combined with the incentives discussed previously,
these factors suggest that local police departments are ill suited to
undertake broad, active searches for terrorists. 158
3. Changed Racial Dynamics
Racial paradigms have changed dramatically since the
1960s, especially in urban areas. 159 The "white flight" of the 1970s
and 1980s produced urban communities composed heavily, even

15'See generally Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
152See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 124, at 843-44 (noting that

"eleven thousand FBI agents will not soon displace 700,000 local police
officers").
153 Metzler, supra note 30, at 62.
154 Id. Metzler also mentions that police "conduct searches and investigate
potential threats." Id.
155Stuntz, supra note 28, at 2160.
156See
157See
151

id.
id.

Jeffrey Horvath, Testimony Before United States Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, (2008) http://judiciary.authoring.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm
(stating his view that "hometown security is homeland security"); Thacher,
supra note 134, at 672 ("If federal officials hope to enlist cooperation from local
governents for offender search ...

cities have to resist.").
159 See ARMOR, supra note 133,
133;

WEIHER,

supra note 133.

they should recognize the strong reasons

JACKSON,

supra note 133;

MASSEY,

supra note
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predominantly of minorities. 160 Additionally, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965161 greatly increased minority participation in politics,
which has only continued to increase in the decades following its
passage. 162 For example, since the 1980s, New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and San Francisco, have each elected a non-white
mayor, 163 and African-American Barack Obama has been
inaugurated as President of the United States. 164 Indeed, the
political influence minorities wield is enormous. This
empowerment extends to modern police forces as well. 165 Today,
police forces are more
integrated than ever before, and much more
16 6
so than in the 1960s.
As David Sklansky states, "The altered demographics of
American policing do not change everything, but they may well
mean that some features of criminal procedure law deserve to be

160

See ARMOR, supra note 133, JACKSON, supra note 133; MASSEY, supra note

133; WEIHER, supra note 133. But see Audrey G. McFarlane, The New
Innercity: Class Transformation, ConcentratedAffluence and the Obligations of
the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3-5 (2006) (noting an increasingly
diverse urban population).
16'42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
162 Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1161.
163 Id.

164

Carl Hulse, Obama Is Sworn In as the 44th President,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,

2009.
165Sklansky, supra note 13 1, at 1210 ("The virtually all-white, virtually all-male
departments of the 1950s and 1960s have given way to departments with large
numbers of female and minority officers, often led by female or minority
chiefs.").
166Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1162 ("African-Americans today make
up a significant percentage of all urban police departments."). Recent data
confirms that minority representation in police departments continues to grow,
especially in large cities. In cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants, minorities
comprised 38.l1% of police forces in 2000, compared to 29.8% in 1990. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1N LARGE

CITIES, 1990-2000 at 3 (2002). Nationwide, "[r]acial and ethnic minorities
comprised 23.6% of full-time sworn personnel in 2003, up from 22.6% in 2000,

and

14.6%

in 1987."

LOCAL POLICE

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

DEPARTMENTS,

2003 at iii (2006).

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
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reconsidered ....,,167 Racial integration of the nation's police
forces, internal police policy reforms, 168 political empowerment of
minorities, and the police's accountability to the community it
serves provide incentives on the police vastly different from those
in the 1960s.1 69 Indeed,
[T]he modern regime insists on hyper-specific rules based
on the assumption that white political establishments can't
be relied on to punish - and can in fact be expected to
reward - law enforcers who abuse discretion to harass
minorities. That anxiety is less well founded now that law
enforcers in America's big cities are accountable to political
establishments that more fairly represent AfricanAmericans. 170
Racial integration may protect citizens in three ways. First,
minority officers may better understand minority communities,
enabling them to more effectively recognize and address
171
community needs with minimal intrusion on individual privacy.
Second, minority officers may legitimize the police, thus
engendering helpful community support rather than resentment,
and further encourage the police to act reasonably to maintain this
relationship. 172 Third, integration may broaden all officers'
perspectives and reduce officer prejudice. 173 These benefits are not
167Sklansky, supra note 131, at 1242.
168See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LOCAL

POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at iv (2006) (showing that in 2003 90% of agencies

serving cities with over 250,000 residents had written policies about racial
profiling by officers).
169 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1161.
170Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1182; see also Sklansky, supra note 131,
at 1213 ("[P]olice officers are far less unified today and far less likely to have an
'us-them' view of civilians.").
171
See Sklansky, supra note 131, at 1224.
172See id.

173Indeed, "the experience of working together across lines of social division ..

•though not untroubled by prejudice and hostility, tends to reduce prejudice and
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thought to reduce police effectiveness in fighting crime. 174
Although modern incentives do not entirely prevent racial
discrimination, and therefore do not justify throwing away Fourth
Amendment protections entirely, courts can properly consider such
factors in determining whether a law permits police
unconstitutionally broad
authority. 175 Such considerations likely
1 76
Hiibel.
played a role in
4.

Modern Incentives and Circumstances
Accommodated

In other areas of criminal procedure, the Court has
recognized these modern incentives, authorizing police discretion
of a type previously deemed unconstitutionally
susceptible to
17 7
arbitrary and discriminatory application.
178
The Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
invalidated an ordinance on vagueness grounds because it "made
criminal those activities that by modern standards are typically
considered innocuous."' 1 7 9 But the Court, in United States v.
Arvizu' 8° held that a border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion
to suspect the defendant of drug smuggling, even though the
factors the officer relied upon seemed innocuous when considered
individually. During oral arguments, Justice O'Connor noted that
"we live in a perhaps more dangerous age today than we did when
hostility." Id. at 1230 (citing

CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 84 (2003)).

174Sklansky, supra note 131, at 1233.
175Id. at 1241 ("The most that can be said with confidence is that the dramatic
but still incomplete integration of American police departments does not remove

the entire foundation of criminal procedure law, but neither can it be entirely
ignored.").
171
See Snyder, supra note 2, at 446.
177
See id. at 448 (referencing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 171 (1972)).
17'
405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972).
179Snyder, supra note 2, at 449.
180534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
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this event took place."' 18 1 She further "expressed concern that the
Ninth Circuit, in ruling against the government, was applying an
excessively rigid form of the 'totality of the circumstances' test,
and that this
rigidity was more than 'common sense would dictate
82
today."1
The Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) program, which
encourages location-specific preventative policing, 183 provides
another example. Such tactics were criticized as discriminatory and
deemed unconstitutional
before the community policing
84 but have since been upheld. 18 5
revolution,1
Additionally, Hiibel can be seen as consistent with the
Court's decision in Berkemer v. McCarty.186 The cases'
circumstances differ in two important respects. First, Hiibel
authorizes a much more limited authority to police officers
conducting a Terry stop investigation. 187 In Berkemer, the Court
exempted routine traffic stops from Miranda requirements;
thereby, permitting police to ask such Terry-stopped individuals a
variety of questions, but denying officers the authority to arrest
individuals who refused to answer.18 8 In contrast, the Nevada
statute permits police to arrest individuals only for refusing to
identify themselves, not for refusing to answer any other
181

Stulin, supra note 2, at 1479 (citations omitted).

182 Id. at 1479-80 (citations omitted).

113See Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, The Key Elements of ProblemOriented Policing, http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p-elements
Apr. 25, 2008).

(last visited

184Maryland

v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990) (holding that "[e]ven in high
crime areas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed is
significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk for

weapons can be conducted").
185 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (finding a Terry stop
reasonable when stop was based heavily on the fact that the suspect was in a
"high crime area," noting that "officers are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation").
...
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
187See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004).
188See

Berkemer 468 U.S. at 439-40.
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questions. 189 Second, Berkemer was decided in 1984, before
modern police incentives materialized. While these changes do not
permit just any expansion of police authority, the Court has
demonstrated its willingness to weigh external police incentives in
considering whether a statute is unconstitutionally permissive, and
likely did so in Hiibel. The Hiibel decision thus grants officers
narrower powers than does Berkemer, which are less susceptible to
abuse on their own, as well as in light of modern incentives, and
therefore require
the accompaniment of fewer tempering
19 0
restrictions.
V.

ENSURING FUTURE POLICE RESTRAINT

Although existing incentives discourage police misconduct,
legitimizing and regulating police conduct effectively and funding
local police departments adequately would further ensure police
officers employ their authority reasonably.
A. Legitimize and Regulate Police Discretion
Police discretion should be legitimized and its use
regulated. In the 1960s and earlier, "the prevalent assumption of
both the police and the public was that the police had no discretion
- that their job was to function in strict accordance with the
law."' 9 1 Despite the vast changes to criminal procedure doctrine
since the 1960s, modern criminal procedure doctrine still clings to
the fantasy that proper policing requires an objective justification
for police actions. Perhaps the most glaring example of this can be

"9

E.g.,

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)

(holding that an

"interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the
police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure").
'9' See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974) ("[I]t does not
follow that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that
might deter police misconduct.").

191 Livingston, supra note 61, at 193 (citing HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A

FREE SOCIETY 105 (1977)).
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seen in police officers' written reports and court testimony, in
which officers are forced to "gild the lily" - i.e. concocting
objective grounds to justify a successful search or seizure. 19 2 Such
testimony does not reflect how officers react to situations as they
unfold on the street. 193 Officers act on their hunches, and rightly
SO. 194 As Craig Lerner notes, "The nub of the problem is that
individuals do and will prejudge people according to age, sex, and
race, and it is not entirely clear that we want police officers to
ignore such data."' 195 Resource constraints, in fact, demand that
officers discriminate between
situations likely and unlikely to
19 6
require their intervention.
Criminal procedure doctrine should not require officers to
perjure themselves to justify good policing; it should "recognize
the legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques in
combating inner-city crime," 197 while ensuring adequate
procedural safeguards to protect communities from abusive police
behavior. Hiibel promotes efficient and particularized policecitizen interactions, but until police discretion is frankly
192 Craig

S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59

VAND. L. REV.

407, 469 (2006) ("Why it pleases some to have police officers parrot back
slogans from previous judicial opinions is not entirely clear to me; and those
who enthusiastically support the current regime would need to acknowledge its
costs . . . which doubtless include the breeding of cynicism among police

officers.") (citations omitted).
193Livingston, supra note 61, at 191 ("Significant sociological research show[s]
that patrol officers invoking public order laws in the service of ordermaintenance ends do not consider these laws and then apply them to the facts in
the manner of a law student taking an exam. Rather, police officers blend legal
knowledge, 'common sense,' and various behavioral norms in using such laws
to deal with problems they are called upon the handle.").
194 See Lerner, supra note 192, at 472 ("Police officers are, or should
be, in the
business of policing. To do this difficult job well, police officers, just like judges
and prosecutors, need a realm of freedom in which to act, and to some degree
this
means a freedom to act upon their hunches.").
195
Id. at 471.
196See Livingston, supra note 61, at 193 (calling discretion "a necessary
consequence of limited resources and the need to prioritize").
197Kahan & Meares, supra note 48, at 1154 (noting the need for a new criminal
procedure doctrine).
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recognized, legitimized, and regulated, officers without "explicit
authority to deal effectively with the problems they encounter" will
continue to be seen as "dirty workers," nevertheless "doing
what
1
has to be done through the exercise of their discretion." 98
B. Fund Community Policing Adequately
Sufficient funding is required to provide police departments
the personnel and other resources necessary to conduct community
policing activities. A lack of resources may limit policecommunity meetings and other friendly interactions, thereby
inhibiting the development of the essential cooperative policecommunity relationship. Since the Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) program was created in 1994,199 the Department
of Justice's COPS office has distributed over $12 billion 20 0 to
"promote police integrity and build greater trust and mutual respect
between police and the public." 20 1 Additionally, the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program provides state and
local governments with additional funding for initiatives targeted
to "prevent and control crime and to improve the criminal justice
202
system,"202 including
community policing initiatives. 203 In fiscal
year (FY) 2006, Congress funded the Judge
Advocate General
20 4
(JAG) program with $1.095 billion dollars.

198GEORGE L. KELLING AND CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS

167 (1996).
199Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796.
200 COPS Office: Funding Opportunities, U.S. Department of Justice,

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?ltem-65 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
201 Carl Peed, Director of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (Mar. 18, 2004).
202 Programs: Justice Assistance Grant (JAG), Bureau of Justice Assistance,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/jag.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
20342 U.S.C.A. § 3751 (a)(West 2008).

204 42 U.S.C.A. § 3758 (West 2008).
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However, the Bush Administration has made severe cuts in
these federal programs in recent years. In FY 2008, COPS is slated
to receive just over $320 million, 20 5 a severe decrease from the
high of $1.490 billion in FY 1998. 206 Additionally, although the
U.S. Senate approved FY 2008 JAG funding totaling $660 million,
the President's threat to veto the Omnibus Appropriation package
forced a reduction of JAG funding to $170 million 20 7 - 67% less
than the $520 million for FY 2007.208 Furthermore, both programs
are slated to receive no funding whatsoever in FY 2009. 2 09 These
cuts have prompted a slew of outcries from law enforcement
officials whose community policing initiatives depend on financial
support from the federal government. 210 Proposed funding in the
COPS Improvements Act of 2007 and in the 2008 supplemental
appropriations bill would restore and increase funding for these
programs. 2 11 Passing such legislation would ensure that

205

COPS Office: COPS FY 2008 Funding, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2033 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
206
COPS
Office:
COPS
History,
U.S.
Dep't
of
Justice,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?ltem 44#2006 (last visited Apr. 25,
2008).

207 Press Release, Sen. Barack Obama, Obama Statement on Drastic Funding
Cuts for Criminal Justice Program in Illinois (Apr. 3, 2008) (on file with author).
208 Horvath, supra note 158.
209

Id.

210 E.g., Horvath, supra note 158 (calling COPS funding cuts "madness"); Letter
from National Association of Attorneys General to The Leadership of Congress
(Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with author) (stating that "[JAG] funding cuts will
devastate state law enforcement efforts . . ."); PCCD Chairman Warns Federal
Funding Cuts Will Impair Public Safety, Criminal Justice Improvements,
Services for Juveniles and Victims of Crime, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS141367+07Jan2008+PRN20080107 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) (stating that JAG cuts "will

hamper justice improvements and innovations which ultimately help to protect
our citizens").

211S. 368, 110th Cong. (2007); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.

No. 110-252, 122 Stat. 2324.
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community-policing incentives
continue to restrain the arbitrary
212
exercise of police authority.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As an accurate reflection of the realities of modern policing
within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, Hiibel deserves to be
praised rather than lamented. In light of enormous changes to
police procedure specifically and American society generally since
the 1960s, the costs of some formerly necessary restrictions on
police conduct today outweighs the benefits. By finding Nevada's
stop-and-identify statute constitutional, the Court removed one
such constraint. In so holding, the Court recognized the fact that
distinguishing cases of national security from other criminal
procedure cases no longer makes sense. One can only hope that the
Court will continue to honor the intent of the Bill of Rights'
framers by accounting for social changes in all of its future
jurisprudence, not just criminal procedure.

212 Department of Justice studies suggest that cuts in COPS funding since 2000

may have already begun to restrict community policing activities, and
accompanying incentives. While bicycle use among police departments rose
during the 1990s, it dropped from 2000 to 2003.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE

STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003 at 13

(2006). Furthermore, "[i]n all population categories the percentage of local
police departments using community policing officers in 2003 was greater than
in 1997, but less than in 2000." Id. at 20.

